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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW JERSEY
Both this case and Browner v. American Trucking
Associations, Inc., No. 99-1257, to be heard in tandem, arise
out of challenges brought by cross-petitioners to the EPA’s
promulgation of revised National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter (PM) and ozone.
Both cases, moreover, concern the validity of EPA’s
construction of the Clean Air Act that underlies the revised
PM and ozone NAAQS. In No. 99-1257, cross-petitioners
(filing there as respondents) contend that EPA’s construction
of the Clean Air Act violates the nondelegation doctrine. In
this case, cross-petitioners contend that the Clean Air Act
itself bars EPA’s longstanding position that the statute
precludes the agency from considering costs in setting the
NAAQS.
Cross-petitioners seek to link the two cases by claiming
that the source of the Clean Air Act’s constitutional infirmity
is EPA’s refusal to interpret the Act to allow for the
consideration of costs in setting the NAAQS.
Crosspetitioners thus attempt to persuade this Court to reject
EPA’s interpretation of the Act by invoking the canon that
courts should construe statutes so as to avoid invalidating
them on constitutional grounds.
In our brief filed in No. 99-1257, however, we have
established the absence of any merit to cross-petitioners’
claim of undue delegation.
Brief of Respondents
Massachusetts and New Jersey, Browner v. American
Trucking Assns., at 20-24 (MA & NJ Br.). Because crosspetitioners have so closely linked their statutory argument in
this case to their constitutional argument in No. 99-1257, the
former should fall based on the weakness of the latter. A
wholly insubstantial constitutional argument can never be a
legitimate basis for rejecting an otherwise valid agency
statutory interpretation. But that is especially so where, as in
this case, cross-petitioners’ proffered interpretation would
not avoid the constitutional problem as they see it.
There are, moreover, no other possible bases for
upsetting EPA’s unbroken position that the Clean Air Act

allows both EPA and the States to consider costs in
implementing the NAAQS, but does not allow EPA to
consider costs in setting the NAAQS in the first instance.
The plain meaning of the statutory language permits no
other conclusion. And, contrary to the gloomy exaggerations
of cross-petitioners and their supporters, the many decades
of federal air pollution regulation confirm the wisdom of
Congress’s deliberate and carefully crafted choices about
precisely how costs should be considered in protecting the
quality of the nation’s air.
STATEMENT
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
The NAAQS form the centerpiece of the Clean Air Act.
They protect public health by governing the quality of the
nation’s outdoor air. These standards are not, however, selfimplementing; they do not themselves directly apply to any
source of air pollution. They apply instead directly only to
those federal and state governmental authorities responsible
for ensuring that the standards are met. For that reason,
while the NAAQS are “standards” in name, they are more
akin to statutory policy objectives in their actual operation.
Federal and state authorities are statutorily obliged to
develop a series of implementing measures designed to
achieve compliance with the NAAQS. The Clean Air Act
itself mandates some of those implementing measures and
their respective timetables. The design and application of
other implementing measures are left to the discretion of the
appropriate federal or state governmental authority.
A fundamental distinction between the statutory factors
relevant to the setting of a NAAQS and the statutory factors
relevant to implementing measures designed to achieve a
NAAQS is central to the operation of the Act. Congress
deliberately and carefully decided to apply different
requirements to the very different regulatory tasks of setting
regulatory objectives and designing implementing measures.
In particular, Congress concluded that while costs and
related practicality and feasibility concerns should be

considered in a variety of ways in implementing the NAAQS,
they should not be considered in setting them.
During the last three decades of experience with the
Clean Air Act, Congress has steadfastly maintained that
essential distinction. Congress has repeatedly amended the
Act in both isolated and more sweeping ways to provide for
more or less consideration of costs and feasibility in aspects
of the statute concerned with implementation of the NAAQS.
These changes sometimes reflect congressional response to
new knowledge and, other times, simply to changing political
priorities. Yet, throughout these same thirty years, many of
which were marked by considerable controversy over the
costs of environmental protection, Congress has not once
altered the basic format for setting the NAAQS, a format that
from the very beginning has excluded the consideration of
costs.
Setting the NAAQS
Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act require the
Administrator of EPA to establish and periodically revise
NAAQS for a limited subset of air pollutants. See 42 U.S.C.
7408-7409. Section 108 provides that NAAQS may be set
only for air pollutants that “cause or contribute to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare” and “the presence of which in the ambient
air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
sources.” See 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B). Accordingly, the
Administrator may regulate a pollutant under the NAAQS
program only if she first finds that its widespread presence in
the ambient air poses a threat to public health or welfare.
The Clean Air Act provides for the establishment of both
“primary” and “secondary” NAAQS. The essential distinction
between the two is that primary NAAQS “protect the public
health” while secondary NAAQS “protect the public welfare.”
More particularly, Section 109(b)(1) of the Act defines the
primary NAAQS as:
ambient air quality standards the attainment and
maintenance of which in the judgment of the
Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an

adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the
public health.
42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1) (emphasis added). A secondary
NAAQS is defined as:
a level of air quality the attainment and maintenance of
which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such
criteria, is requisite to protect the public welfare from any
known or anticipated effects associated with the presence
of such air pollutant in the ambient air.
42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2) (emphasis added). For each standard,
therefore, the Act directs the Administrator to exercise her
“judgment” based on specific “criteria” with the added
requirement for primary NAAQS that the Administrator also
allow for “an adequate margin of safety.”
Section 108(a)(2) further details the precise content of
the air quality “criteria” on which the NAAQS must be based.
These criteria must:
reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating
the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public
health and welfare which may be expected from the
presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying
quantities.
42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2). Thus, the only “effects” that are
relevant under the prescribed criteria are those expected
from the pollutant’s “presence . . . in the ambient air.”
Finally, Section 109(d)(1) of the Clean Air Act directs the
Administrator to review the criteria and NAAQS every five
years. 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(1). Based on this review, the
Administrator may promulgate a new NAAQS or revise an
existing one. 42 U.S.C. 7409(a)(1). The criteria relevant to
the decisions whether and how to revise an existing NAAQS
are the same as the criteria, described in section 108, for
establishing a NAAQS in the first instance. Id.
Implementing the NAAQS
A NAAQS does not, standing alone, directly regulate any
source of air pollution. It instead simply establishes a
statutory objective that the Clean Air Act makes federal and
state governmental regulatory authorities responsible for

achieving within a series of prescribed timetables. Hence,
while Sections 108 and 109 govern the setting of NAAQS,
including their subsequent revision, other Clean Air Act
statutory provisions govern the implementation of the
NAAQS.
Section 110 of the Act, for instance, provides for the
development by states and, if necessary, by the federal
government, of state or federal “implementation plans” (SIPs
or FIPs) that provide for the “implementation, maintenance,
and enforcement” of NAAQS throughout each state. 42
U.S.C. 7410(a)(1). While section 110 details a host of
requirements for these plans, including the control of
stationary sources “as necessary to assure that [NAAQS]
1
are achieved[,]” the overarching requirement is that the
implementation plan, as a whole, make the necessary
progress toward NAAQS compliance. “Perhaps the most
important forum for consideration of claims of economic and
technological infeasibility is before the state agency
formulating the implementation plan. So long as the national
standards are met, the State may select whatever mix of
control devices it desires, . . . and industries with particular
economic or technological problems may seek special
treatment in the plan itself.” Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427
U.S. 246, 266 (1975).
Other provisions of the Clean Air Act specifically
concerned with implementation, moreover, expressly provide
for the consideration of costs. For instance, section 111
provides for EPA’s promulgation of technology-based
standards of performance applicable to new stationary
sources of air pollutants, including pollutants governed by
the NAAQS. Those performance standards must “tak[e] into
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair
quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements.” 42 U.S.C. 7411(a). Federal emissions
standards applicable to mobile sources and aircraft, many of
which emit NAAQS pollutants, likewise mandate taking costs
into account. See 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(3)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C.
1

42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2)(C).

7571(b).
The nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act, which
apply to those parts of the nation not yet in attainment with
NAAQS, similarly reflect significant attention to costs and
technological feasibility. The touchstone for “nonattainment
plans” designed to achieve the NAAQS is “reasonableness”
in the form of “reasonable further progress” towards attaining
the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. 7501(1), 42 U.S.C. 7502(c)(2). The
Act does not require the immediate attainment of the
NAAQS, regardless of the economic costs of such a
requirement, notwithstanding the passage long ago of
previous statutory deadlines. Nonattainment plans must
instead provide for “reasonably available control measures”
and new and modified major stationary sources must,
among other things, achieve the “lowest achievable emission
rate,” which explicitly excludes limitations “that are not
achievable.” 42 U.S.C. 7502(c)(1), 7503(a)(2), 7501(3)(A).
The Act also allows EPA to construe the term “source” for
the purposes of these nonattainment requirements to allow a
facility to avoid costlier controls by reducing air pollution in
one part of a manufacturing site more than it increases
pollution in another part of the site. See Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984).

History of the Clean Air Act and NAAQS
Program
The Clean Air Act today embodies no fewer than eleven
2
separate Acts of Congress, stretching back over fifty years.
A central part of the legislative debates surrounding each of
these enactments has been the extent to which regulatory
objectives should turn on public health and welfare concerns
as well as the extent to which the regulatory means of
achieving those objectives should turn on considerations of
economic cost or technological feasibility. With regard to
implementation, Congress has made numerous extremely
precise and significant refinements in the statutory language
relating to where, when, and to what extent costs should be
relevant in establishing pollution control requirements
applicable to individual sources of air pollution. By contrast,
Congress has, for three decades, steadfastly adhered to the
fundamental position, reflected in sections 108 and 109 of
the Clean Air Act, that any such cost considerations should
not similarly play any role in the setting of the air quality
criteria and standards that have always served as the
objectives of federal air pollution legislation.
Congress first addressed the question of what “criteria”
should be relevant to setting air quality standards in the
3
original 1963 Clean Air Act. The 1963 statute authorized
the federal government–acting through the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)–to
establish “criteria” for air quality. 77 Stat. 392 § 3(c)(2). The
language describing the scope and content of the original air
quality criteria is strikingly similar to the corresponding
4
language of the Clean Air Act today. Although Congress
2

See William H. Rodgers, Environmental Law 124 (2d ed. 1994).
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See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392.

4

The statute provided:
4Whenever [the Secretary] determines that there is a particular air
pollution agent (or combination of agents), present in the air in
certain quantities, producing effects harmful to the health or
welfare of persons, the Secretary shall compile and publish criteria

used the same term, “criteria,” for both the scientific
information on the consequences of air pollution and
5
standards for air quality, the goal of the standards was
clear: the Secretary was to recommend to local, state, or
interstate air pollution control agencies those standards
which “in [the Secretary’s] judgment may be necessary to
6
protect the public health and welfare.”
In the Air Quality Act of 1967, Congress used language
virtually identical to that in the 1963 Act in again directing the
7
Secretary of HEW to establish air quality criteria. The 1967
Act also introduced some of the language that now governs
the NAAQS themselves: the Act directed the Secretary to
issue “such criteria of air quality as in his judgment may be
8
requisite for the protection of the public health and welfare.”
Nevertheless, Congress continued to rely mostly on the
states for the development of rules governing air quality
(standards) while relying on the federal government for the
development of the scientific documents on which the
standards were to depend (criteria).
It was not until the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 that
Congress provided the federal government with the
reflecting accurately the latest scientific knowledge useful in
indicating the kind and extent of such effects which may be
expected from the presence of such air pollutant agent (or
combination of agents) in the air in varying quantities.
§ (3)(c)(2), 77 Stat. at 395; cf. 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2).
5

See § 3(c)(3), 77 Stat. at 395.
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Id.

7

The criteria were to reflect “the latest scientific knowledge useful
in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on health
and welfare which may be expected from the presence of an air
pollution agent, or combination of agents in the ambient air, in
varying quantities.” Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148,
sec. 107(b)(2), § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 491.
8
§ 107(b)(1), 81 Stat. at 491.

exclusive authority to set nationally uniform standards for air
quality. The states retained the task of implementing the air
quality standards, but EPA–created during Congress’s
9
deliberations on the 1970 Amendments –was directed to set
10
the standards.
With respect to the air quality criteria, Congress required
for the first time that the criteria describe effects on “public
health and welfare.” Previously, it had required that criteria
11
describe effects on the health and welfare “of persons” or
12
simply on “health and welfare.”
Yet, while changing the
language, Congress instructed EPA to base the very first
13
NAAQS on HEW’s existing criteria.
These criteria
considered only the consequences for health and welfare of
the presence of pollutants in the ambient air and they
stressed the difficulties of drawing a bright line between
14
pollution that is harmful and pollution that is not. Congress
in 1970 responded to the challenges of scientific uncertainty
by further providing that the air quality standards protecting
human health–the primary standards–must embody “an
15
adequate margin of safety.”
During the past thirty years, Congress has enacted
9

See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 5 U.S.C.A. App. (Supp. 1992).

10

See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec.
109, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-80.
11

Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 3(c)(2), 77 Stat.
392, 395.
12

Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec. 107(b)(1), § 2,
81 Stat. 485, 491.
13

See 42 U.S.C. 7409(a)(1)(A), 7409(b)(1).

14

See, e.g., National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA),
HEW, Guidelines for the Development of Air Quality Standards
and Implementation Plans 16 (1969).
15

Sec. 109(b)(1), § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1679.

numerous revisions to the Clean Air Act, most significantly in
16
1977 and 1990, and Congress has considered and rejected
17
many more proposed amendments to the Act.
The Act
today “consumes 313 pages of the Statutes at Large, nearly
ten times the length of the original Clean Air Act of 1970. . .
18
“
Yet, in the face of all this ongoing legislative activity,
Congress has left essentially untouched the fundamental
“public health” and “welfare” basis long in existence for the
development of air quality criteria and NAAQS. Then, as
now, the NAAQS are to be based on “the kind and extent of
all identifiable effects on public health and welfare which
may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the
ambient air.”
In sharp contrast, Congress has made a host of both
targeted and sweeping revisions to the Act designed to
address the extent to which economic costs and economic
and technological feasibility should be relevant in
establishing pollution control requirements to implement the
NAAQS. For example, Congress added in 1977 and 1990
the detailed nonattainment provisions designed to provide
areas not meeting the NAAQS with both more time and more
19
guidance in achieving that statutory objective.
16

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat.
685; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2399.
17

For example, Congress held extensive oversight hearings on the
Clean Air Act just a few months after the D.C. Circuit in Lead
Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1042 (1980), upheld EPA’s view that costs are irrelevant
to the setting of NAAQS. See Clean Air Act Oversight: Hearings
before the Sen. Comm. Envt & Pub. Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pts 1&2 (1981). Of course, the proper role of costs in setting
NAAQS arose in those hearings, id. at 85, yet the hearings
produced no change in the NAAQS provisions.
18

Rodgers, Environmental Law, supra, § 3.2, p. 140.

19

See 42 U.S.C. 7501-7515.

Congress has also added a series of provisions allowing
for specific exemptions and extensions based on economic
concerns. For example, both the President of the United
States and State Governors are allowed, in specified
circumstances, to suspend statutory requirements based on
concerns related to unemployment and plant closings. 42
U.S.C. 7410(f)(2), 7410(g)(1)(B). Congress has similarly
provided relief from motor vehicle emissions standards,
transportation control measures, and emission limitations
20
applicable to certain manufacturing facilities.
In sum, Congress has maintained a sharp distinction at
least since passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970, if not long
before, between the role of costs in the setting of the air
quality standards that serve as the Act’s overriding objective
and the role of costs in developing the means for
implementing those standards. Congress concluded early
on that compliance costs should not be relevant to the
former and has never disturbed its initial policy judgment. At
the same time, Congress concluded that such costs should
be relevant to the latter and has since repeatedly revisited
precisely how to take such costs into account, in light of its
ongoing experience with the Act’s actual operation.
B. Particulate Matter and Ozone Rulemakings
In our brief on the merits in Browner v. American Trucking
Associations, Inc., No. 99-1257, we described EPA’s
rulemaking proceedings with respect to the PM and ozone
NAAQS. MA & NJ Br. 20-24. That same description is
equally relevant to the issues in this case.
C. Proceedings Below
In rejecting cross-petitioners’ reading of the Clean Air Act,
20

See Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-319, §§ 4-5, 88 Stat. 246, 256-260; Steel Industry
Compliance Extension Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-23, 95 Stat.
139.

the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its longstanding conclusion that
the plain meaning of the Act forbids EPA from considering
21
costs in setting the NAAQS. U.S. Pet. App. 19a.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) program is one of the signal success
stories of American environmental law. Emissions of most of
the pollutants regulated by the program have dramatically
decreased in the thirty years that the program has been in
place, despite substantial increases in the size of our
22
population and in the amount of economic activity.
In a
recent peer-reviewed, retrospective study of the Clean Air
Act’s first twenty years, the EPA concluded that the Act had
produced almost 22 trillion dollars more in benefits than it
had imposed in costs, and EPA believed that even this
dazzling amount probably understated the benefits of the
23
statute. A widely cited survey of EPA managers conducted
21

The court also held that EPA had erred in declining to consider
evidence that ground-level ozone is beneficial for people because
it helps to counteract the adverse health effects caused by the
decline in the ozone layer (itself caused by air pollution). U.S. Pet.
App. 44a-49a. No one has sought review of this ruling.
22

See Richard N.L. Andrews, Managing the Environment,
Managing Ourselves – A History of American Environmental Policy
280 (Yale Univ. 1999) (“Emissions of particulate matter (smoke)
dropped by nearly 80 percent from 1970 to 1994, for instance, and
of lead by 98 percent, even as the U.S. population increased by 27
percent, its gross domestic product by 90 percent, and its vehicle
use by 111 percent. Emissions of carbon monoxide and volatile
organic compounds each dropped by over 20 percent, and sulfur
by one-third; only nitrogen oxides increased.”) (citing U.S. Council
on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: 25th Annual
Report–1994-95, 179, 182 (1997).
23

EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, The Benefits and Costs of the
Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 at ES-8 (Oct. 1997). This report
focused almost exclusively on the consequences of regulating the

in the late 1980s concluded that the air pollution addressed
by the NAAQS program should be ranked first on a list of
environmental problems ranked according to the risks they
24
posed to human health, welfare, and ecosystems.
Cross-petitioners want to disrupt this successful
regulatory regime. They ask this Court to hold, contrary to
thirty years of agency and judicial precedent, that the Clean
Air Act requires EPA to balance costs against benefits in
setting the NAAQS. But in creating the NAAQS program,
Congress was faced with the questions of whether to allow
costs to play any role in this program and, if so, what role
they should play. Congress ultimately chose to exclude the
consideration of costs from the process of setting the
NAAQS but to allow the consideration of costs in the process
of implementing these standards.
1. The meaning of the Clean Air Act is plain, and has
been settled for decades: costs may not be considered in
setting the NAAQS. Sections 108 and 109 of the Act clearly
direct EPA, in setting the NAAQS, to consider only the
effects on public health and welfare of breathing polluted air.
These provisions instruct EPA to base the NAAQS on air
quality criteria that themselves discuss only the effects on
public health and welfare of “the presence of [an air]
pollutant in the ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2). This
instruction leaves no room for the consideration of costs.
Were there any doubt on this point, however, it would be
dispelled by the numerous provisions of the Act explicitly
allowing or requiring the Administrator to consider costs in
implementing the NAAQS; clearly Congress knew how to
permit the agency to consider costs when Congress wanted
to. For cross-petitioners to ask this Court to insert the word
“costs” into sections 108 and 109 in the face of Congress’s
clear decision to exclude it is to request a large and
unwholesome shift in the Court’s approach to interpreting
criteria air pollutants. Id.
24

U.S. EPA, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of
Environmental Priorities 58 (1987).

statutes.
Given the clarity of the statutory text, this Court should not
distort the plain meaning of the Clean Air Act in order to
avoid the constitutional issue of delegation. The error in
rewriting a statute simply to avoid a constitutional issue is
particularly pronounced where, as here, the resolution of the
constitutional issue is, under this Court’s precedents,
straightforward and where, if anything, the proffered
alternative interpretation(s) of the statute would not avoid the
constitutional issue as cross-petitioners see it.
Cross-petitioners’ inability to mount any convincing
argument based on the language or history of the Clean Air
Act forces them to ask this Court to adopt a special canon of
construction tailor-made by them for this case: they ask the
Court to hold that unless Congress explicitly prohibits the
consideration of costs in a statute, costs must be
considered. This is nothing other than an inappropriate plea
to have this Court rewrite the Clean Air Act in order to further
cross-petitioners’ views on social policy.
2. The Clean Air Act is perfectly rational as written and as
understood for three decades. Contrary to the excited
claims of those challenging EPA’s PM and ozone rules, the
Act does not force this country to abandon industrial activity;
it does not allow the Administrator privately to consider costs
and publicly to deny it; and it reflects Congress’s considered
judgment concerning potential tradeoffs between regulatory
costs and health. Finally, by precluding the consideration of
costs in setting the NAAQS but by allowing such
consideration in implementing them, the Clean Air Act avoids
one of the most troublesome features of the cost-benefit
balancing cross-petitioners endorse: its tendency to
underestimate the benefits of regulation and to overestimate
the costs. This tendency also helps to explain what would
otherwise be one of the great unsolved mysteries of the
regulatory state: how a set of standards set without regard to
cost can, even from the perspective of cost-benefit analysis,
become one of the great success stories of environmental
law.
ARGUMENT

I. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
PRECLUDES EPA FROM CONSIDERING COSTS IN
SETTING THE NAAQS
Cross-petitioners and their supporting respondents and
amici offer a dizzying array of possible interpretations of the
25
Clean Air Act. The proffered interpretations do, however,
have one thing in common: all of them would import some
kind of balancing of costs and benefits into the process of
setting the NAAQS.
The plain language of the Clean Air Act admits of only
one conclusion: the Act precludes EPA from considering
costs in setting the NAAQS. “[I]n any case of statutory
construction, our analysis begins with the language of the
statute . . . . And where the statutory language provides a
clear answer, it ends there as well.” Harris Trust & Savings
Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2180, 2191
(2000), quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S.
432, 438 (1999) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). As we explain below, the statutory text alone is
clear enough to resolve the issue presented here; that text
precludes the cost-benefit balancing cross-petitioners
26
embrace. Where Congress has wanted to include some
25

Cross-petitioners and respondents and amici in support of crosspetitioners appear to disagree both over whether EPA is required
or merely permitted to consider non-health factors in setting the
NAAQS (compare ATA Br. 32 with, e.g., American Boiler Mfrs. Am
Br. 4) and over which non-health factors are to be considered
(compare ATA Br. 30 (cost-benefit balancing might mean
analyzing standard according to “significant risks or other similar
rubrics,” or according to the quality-adjusted life-years saved by
the standard) with Hatch Am. Br. 18 (“feasibility concerns would
not trump health” under the statute) and with Inhofe Am. Br. 10-12
(EPA permitted to consider countervailing health risks, risk
significance, cost and technological feasibility)).
26

Lest there remain any doubt, however, we also offer citations to
the legislative history confirming the conclusion that the Clean Air
Act precludes the consideration of costs in setting the NAAQS.

kind of balancing test in health, safety, and environmental
legislation, it has done so clearly, carefully, and with due
attention to the specific circumstances at hand. In the Clean
Air Act itself, Congress clearly and carefully balanced, or
allowed EPA to balance, costs and benefits only when the
NAAQS are being implemented, not when they are being
set. Cross-petitioners’ efforts to force the meaning they
desire into the language of the statute must fail.
A. Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act Clearly
Direct EPA to Consider Only the Effects of Air Pollution
on Public Health and Welfare in Setting the NAAQS
Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act provides that the
primary NAAQS are standards “the attainment and
maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator,
based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of
safety, are requisite to protect the public health.” 42 U.S.C.
7409(b)(1). Secondary NAAQS are those “requisite to
protect the public welfare”; they do not similarly allow for a
margin of safety. 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2). In determining what
it means to “protect the public health” with an “adequate
margin of safety” and what it means to “protect the public
welfare,” it is crucial to consider the kind of evidence
Congress directed EPA to take into account in setting the
NAAQS.
Congress directed EPA to set the NAAQS “based on” the
air quality criteria. 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1)-(2). In formulating
the directive in this way in the 1970 amendments, Congress
eliminated previous language that had required the states, in
setting their own air quality standards, to set standards
“consistent with” both “the air quality criteria and
recommended control techniques” HEW had previously been
27
required to issue.
Clearly, then, in 1970 Congress was
For a fuller account of the evolution of the NAAQS program in
Congress, see MA & NJ Br., No. 99-1257, at 7-19; Clean Air Trust
Am. Br., passim.
27

Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec. 108(c)(1), § 2,

instructing EPA to base the NAAQS on air quality criteria
alone. The content of the criteria documents is thus critical
to determining the content of the NAAQS.
In section 108(a)(2), Congress supplied the answer to the
question concerning the proper scope of the criteria
documents in unambiguous terms. This section provides
that the air quality criteria are to “reflect the latest scientific
knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all
identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be
expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient
air, in varying quantities.” 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2). Thus: air
quality criteria are not to be based on economic information;
the effects of concern are not costs; the effects to be
discussed are not theoretical effects predicted by abstract
economic models; and the relevant effects are not those
arising from regulation itself.
This conclusion is further confirmed by section 108(b)(1).
This provision requires EPA, “[s]imultaneously with the
issuance of criteria under subsection (a) of this section,” to
issue information on the costs and feasibility of various
pollution control technologies.
42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1)
(emphasis added).
Section 108(b)(1) thus clearly
distinguishes the “criteria”–on which NAAQS are to be
“based,” 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2)–from information on economic
costs and technological feasibility.
Section 109(a)(1) and 109(b)(1) together also make plain
that air quality criteria must discuss only the effects of air
pollution on health and welfare, not the effects of regulation
on the economic costs of pollution control. In section
109(a)(1), Congress directed the Administrator to issue,
within thirty days of December 31, 1970, primary and
secondary NAAQS “for each air pollutant for which air quality
criteria have been issued prior to such date,” 42 U.S.C.
7409(a)(1), and in section 109(b), Congress provided that
the new primary and secondary NAAQS were to be “based
28
on such criteria.” 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1)-(2). The criteria
81 Stat. 485, 492 (emphasis added).
28

For air pollutants for which criteria were issued after December

that had been issued prior to the stated date were those
issued by the Secretary of HEW under the prior version of
the Clean Air Act. In directing EPA to set the new NAAQS
based on HEW’s criteria documents, Congress explicitly
endorsed the documents HEW had so far compiled.
The HEW criteria documents that Congress endorsed
confirm the exclusive relevance of scientific evidence of
human health effects and the irrelevance of economic
effects.
HEW opened its 1969 criteria document on
particulate matter with the following description of air quality
criteria:
Air quality criteria are an expression of the scientific
knowledge of the relationship between various
concentrations of air pollutants in the air and their adverse
effects on man and his environment. . . . Air quality criteria
are descriptive; that is, they describe the effects that have
been observed to occur when the ambient air level of a
pollutant has reached or exceeded specific figures for a
29
specific time period.
In keeping with this understanding of the role of air quality
criteria, HEW’s criteria discussed scientific research from
epidemiological, clinical, toxicological, and meteorological
30
investigations. They discussed effects on human health,
31, 1970, EPA was directed to issue NAAQS simultaneously with
those criteria and, again, the NAAQS for such pollutants were to
be “based on such criteria.” 42 U.S.C. 7409(a)(1), 7409(b)(1).
29

See NAPCA, HEW, Pub. No. AP-49, Air Quality Criteria for PM
1-1 (1969) (1969 PM Criteria Doc.); NAPCA, HEW, Pub. No. AP62, Air Quality Criteria for Carbon Monoxide 1-1 (1970) (1970 CO
Criteria Doc.); NAPCA, HEW, Pub. No. AP-64, Air Quality Criteria
for Hydrocarbons 1-1 (1970) (1970 HC Criteria Doc.); NAPCA,
HEW, Pub. No. AP-63, Air Quality Criteria for Photochemical
Oxidants 1-1 (1970) (1970 Ozone Criteria Doc.); NAPCA, HEW,
Pub. No. AP-50, Air Quality Criteria for Sulfur Oxides 1-1 (1969)
(1969 SOx Criteria Doc.); see also Pub. Health Service, HEW,
Pub. No. 1619, Air Quality Criteria for Sulfur Oxides iv (1967)
(1967 SOx Criteria Doc.).
30

See, e.g., 1967 Sox Criteria Doc., supra.

including the initiation and aggravation of respiratory
31
diseases including asthma, impairment of the oxygen32
33
carrying capacity of the blood, and premature death, and
they discussed these effects only insofar as they were tied to
34
air pollution.
HEW’s criteria documents did not discuss
compliance costs, and they did not discuss effects that arose
from regulation itself rather than from air pollution.
Congress’s endorsement of HEW’s basic approach in the
criteria documents compiled as of 1970 thus shows what the
criteria on which the NAAQS are to be based should include
(scientific research into the health effects of pollution) and
what they should not include (economic research into the
35
economic consequences of regulation).
The explicit directive to EPA to base the first NAAQS on
HEW’s criteria documents also helps to explain the meaning
of the “adequate margin of safety” that Congress required for
the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1). The concept of a margin
of safety as embraced in the Clean Air Act was an outgrowth
of HEW’s experience in developing the first criteria
documents. HEW’s review of the scientific literature on the
criteria pollutants had revealed a diverse array of harms
31

See 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-7.
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See 1970 CO Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-3.
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See 1967 SOx Criteria Doc., supra, at xxix.
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See 1967 SOx Criteria Doc., supra, at liii (graphical depiction of
results of studies concerning health and welfare effects of sulfur
oxides); 1969 PM Criteria Doc., supra, at 188-89 (summary of
health effects at various exposure levels); 1970 CO Criteria Doc.,
supra, at 10-7 (table reflecting health effects at various exposure
levels); 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-9 to 10-13 (text and
table detailing health and welfare effects associated with different
levels of exposure).
35

Because of the importance of the issues settled therein, copies of
all the relevant HEW criteria documents that predate passage of
the 1970 Act have been lodged with the Court.

36

which occurred at a diverse array of pollution levels. HEW
also was convinced that the lowest level at which an air
pollutant was shown in scientific research to have caused an
adverse public health effect was not necessarily the lowest
37
level at which that pollutant in fact caused such an effect.
HEW thus recommended that margins of safety be
incorporated in then-existing state air quality standards in
order to remedy the problem of under-protection that might
38
otherwise follow from the limits of scientific proof.
Congress accepted this recommendation when it required in
1970 that the federal government set ambient air quality
39
standards that allowed “an adequate margin of safety.”
36

See sources cited supra, n. 34.
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In its 1969 guidelines on developing air quality criteria, HEW
explained:
37The exposure levels which have thus far been associated with
identifiable effects . . . are not necessarily the lowest levels of
exposure that will produce such effects. Nor are those effects
necessarily the only ones produced by such exposures.
Knowledge of the synergistic effects of air pollutants is limited. So
is knowledge of possible long-term genetic effects. . . . In short, air
quality criteria cannot be interpreted as threshold values; indeed,
for many types of air pollutants, there may not be a threshold of
risk to health and the environment. In the evaluation of biological
effects of environmental contaminants, whether in the community
or occupational environment, accumulating evidence has almost
invariably shown that adverse effects can and do occur at
exposure levels that at one time were considered “safe.”
NAPCA, HEW, Guidelines for the Development of Air Quality
Standards and Implementation Plans, supra, at 16.
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1969 PM Criteria Doc., supra, at 189; see also 1970 Ozone
Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-13; 1970 CO Criteria Doc., supra, at 106.
39

The Senate report on the legislation explained that “margins of
safety are essential to any health-related environmental standards
if a reasonable degree of protection is to be provided against
hazards which research has not yet identified.” S. Rep. No. 911196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1970).

The requirement that EPA allow an adequate margin of
safety in the NAAQS thus signals a congressional embrace
of a particular approach towards the scientific uncertainty
that inevitably attends estimates of the effects of air
pollution, an approach that leans in the direction of stricter
rather than more lenient standards where (as they always
are) the facts are uncertain.
Congress’s embrace of HEW’s original criteria also helps
to explain the meaning of the “public health” to be discussed
in the criteria and protected by the NAAQS. Although
Congress in the 1970 Clean Air Amendments shifted from
requiring that criteria describe effects on “health and
40
welfare” to requiring that they describe effects on “public
health and welfare,” Congress’s simultaneous endorsement
of the criteria documents already compiled demonstrates
Congress’s belief that those documents adequately reflected
the kinds of human health effects Congress thought relevant
to setting the NAAQS. In other words, the insertion of the
word “public” before the word “health” did not fundamentally
change the nature of the inquiry to be conducted in
developing the criteria documents; specifically, it did not
change that inquiry from a scientific investigation of the
health and welfare effects of pollution into an investigation of
the economic costs of regulation. Instead, by targeting
public health, Congress simply instructed EPA to target
health effects in populations rather than in single individuals.
The language of the Clean Air Act also clearly instructs
EPA to consider only the effects on human health and
welfare that are caused by air pollution, not those that might
be caused by regulation itself. In describing the criteria on
which the NAAQS are to be based, section 108(a)(2) makes
this point plain by instructing EPA to consider only the
effects on health and welfare “which may be expected from
the presence of [an air] pollutant in the ambient air, in
varying quantities.” 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2). This is a clear
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Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec. 107(b)(1), § 2,
81 Stat. 485, 491.

directive to EPA to focus on the effects of air pollution, not
the effects of regulation.
Elsewhere in the Act, Congress demonstrated that it knew
how to tell EPA to look at health and welfare effects arising
from causes other than air pollution. Indeed, in the Clean Air
Act, Congress invented a new (albeit clunky) phrase–“nonair
quality impacts”–to refer to such effects. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. 7411(a)(1) (defining “standard of performance” for
new stationary sources to include consideration of, among
other things, “any nonair quality health and environmental
impact”); 42 U.S.C. 7509(d)(2) (requiring states that have not
attained NAAQS by applicable deadlines to revise SIPs to
include measures prescribed by Administrator, including
measures feasible “in light of technological achievability,
costs, and any nonair quality and other air quality-related
health and environmental impacts”); 42 U.S.C. 7545(k)(1)
(directing Administrator, in establishing requirements for
reformulated gasoline, to take into account “the cost of
achieving such emission reductions, any nonair-quality and
other air-quality related health and environmental impacts
and energy requirements”). No such reference to “nonair
quality” impacts appears anywhere in the statutory
provisions relevant to the setting of the NAAQS. Here too,
moreover, Congress’s endorsement of HEW’s original
criteria documents is revealing: HEW did not discuss the
effects of regulation on human health and welfare, it
discussed the effects of air pollution on human health and
welfare.
Consistent with the lessons learned from HEW’s
experience in developing the original criteria documents,
Congress expressly acknowledged the necessity of
deference to the Administrator’s “judgment” in promulgating
any NAAQS based on such criteria. 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1-2).
HEW’s criteria documents testified to the high degree of
scientific uncertainty unavoidably surrounding both the
assessment of public health effects at varying levels of air
pollution and the related task of selecting a level requisite to
protect public health. Congress provided procedural and
substantive guidance for those administrative actions, yet
recognized the Administrator’s decisions would ultimately

require “judgment.”
In directing EPA to set standards to protect the public
health and welfare, Congress nowhere added a qualifier
based on economics or feasibility. Cross-petitioners no
doubt wish that the statute were written differently; they no
doubt wish that the statute provided, for example, that
NAAQS are standards requisite to protect the public health
“in light of economic costs, technological feasibility, or any
other factor.” But the statute is not so written and the words
that Congress in fact used leave no room for crosspetitioners’ preferred policy outcome. The Court should,
accordingly, decline cross-petitioners’ invitation to add to the
factors Congress itself has identified as relevant to the
process of setting the NAAQS. See, e.g., Union Electric Co.
v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (refusing to require
Administrator, in reviewing adequacy of SIPs, to consider
factors (cost and feasibility) not specified by section
110(a)(2) of Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2)). This is
especially so where, as here, Congress clearly paid close
attention to the issue of economic costs and specified that
this factor would play an important role, not in the setting of
the NAAQS, but in their implementation.
B. Congress’s Explicit Recognition of the Relevance of
Costs to the Implementation of the NAAQS Confirms the
Irrelevance of Costs to Setting the NAAQS
The NAAQS themselves do not regulate any source of
pollution. Instead, they set the health-based benchmark that
the regulation of sources of pollution is to achieve. Pollution
sources are regulated under the Act both by the states and
by the federal government. In both state and federal
regulation of pollution sources, costs and feasibility play a
significant role. Moreover, in cases in which efforts to
achieve the NAAQS cause significant economic hardship,
Congress has provided several specific, targeted escape
valves allowing departures from the requirements of the Act.
These features of the Act, discussed in detail below, lead
to two important conclusions. First, because so many
provisions of the Clean Air Act explicitly require or allow EPA

to take costs into account in setting standards under the Act,
Congress’s failure to explicitly allow EPA to consider costs in
setting the NAAQS should be taken as decisive evidence
that it meant to preclude such consideration in that process.
“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.” GMC v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 537-38
(1990) (unanimously declining to insert deadline into section
110(a)(3)(A) of Clean Air Act, noting Congress’s
establishment of explicit deadlines elsewhere in Act), quoting
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), quoting
United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.
1972). Second, to import the consideration of costs into the
process of setting the NAAQS would upset Congress’s
carefully constructed, and carefully limited, scheme for
allowing such economic costs to affect the quality of the
ambient air.
The states are the entities primarily responsible for
implementing the NAAQS. The states’ basic obligation
under the Act is to ensure attainment and maintenance of
the NAAQS by the relevant deadline; “[s]o long as the
national standards are met, the State may select whatever
mix of control devices it desires . . .” Union Electric
Company, 427 U.S. at 266; see also Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). The
states’ deadlines, however, may be extended by the
Administrator based in part on the “availability and feasibility
of pollution control measures.” 42 U.S.C. 7502(a)(2)(A). In
numerous ways, moreover, states themselves are
encouraged to choose the most cost-effective or least
economically disruptive means of achieving the NAAQS. 42
U.S.C. 7410(a)(2)(A) (including “economic incentives such
as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of emissions
rights” in the list of control measures states may include in
their SIPs); 7410(a)(2)(H) (requiring states to provide for
revision of their SIPs “as may be necessary to take account
of . . . the availability of improved or more expeditious
methods of attaining” the NAAQS); 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(3)(B)

(in aftermath of energy crisis of early 1970s, requiring states
to determine whether they could revise their SIPs in relation
to fuel burning stationary sources without interfering with
NAAQS compliance).
In limited circumstances, states may temporarily avoid
some of their obligations under the statute in order to
prevent significant economic disruption and unemployment.
For example, a Governor may petition the President “to
determine that a national or regional energy emergency
exists of such severity” that sanctions for excess emissions
of sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxides should be temporarily
suspended. 42 U.S.C. 7410(f). Such a suspension may be
issued only upon a finding of “high levels of unemployment
or loss of necessary energy supplies for residential
dwellings” within the vicinity of an affected source. 42
U.S.C. 7410(f)(2). In addition, if a state has submitted a
revision to a SIP which has been pending before the
Administrator for a year or more, the Governor of that state
may temporarily suspend the provisions of the SIP she
seeks to revise, if the revised SIP meets the requirements of
the Act and “is necessary (i) to prevent the closing for one
year or more of any source of air pollution, and (ii) to prevent
substantial increases in unemployment which would result
from such closing.” 42 U.S.C. 7410(g)(1). In a similar vein,
a Governor may, in cooperation with the President, require
the use of locally or regionally available coal or coal
derivatives in order to avoid “significant local or regional
economic disruption or unemployment.” 42 U.S.C. 7425(a)(b).
The federal government also plays a substantial role in
efforts to achieve the NAAQS.
EPA sets emissions
standards for cars and trucks, major new stationary sources
of pollution, and other pollution sources. Although these
requirements need not pertain exclusively to the pollutants
regulated under the NAAQS program, in practice, those
pollutants have been their focus. Congress has allowed or
required EPA to consider costs in every one of these
standard-setting contexts. See 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (in
setting standards for mobile sources, Administrator is
directed to give “appropriate consideration” to “cost, energy,

and safety factors”); 42 U.S.C. 7545(c)(2)(B) (Administrator
may not regulate fuel additive on account of its harm to
vehicle emission control systems unless it first does “cost
benefit analysis” of such regulation); 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(1),
(b)(1) (for certain categories of new sources, Administrator
must set “standards of performance” which take into account
“costs and nonair quality health and environmental impacts
and energy requirements”); 42 U.S.C. 7547(a)(3) (in setting
deadlines for compliance with emissions standards for
nonroad vehicles, Administrator is directed to give
“appropriate consideration” to cost); 42 U.S.C. 7571(b) (in
setting deadlines for compliance with emissions standards
for aircraft, Administrator is directed to give “appropriate
consideration” to cost).
Thus both the states and EPA enjoy extensive authority to
consider costs in their efforts to achieve air quality meeting
the NAAQS. To be sure, neither the states nor EPA has the
authority to revise the NAAQS themselves based on costs,
or to extend the deadlines for meeting the NAAQS beyond
the deadlines and extensions provided in the statute. Only
Congress has this authority. A brief review of the history of
the NAAQS program in Congress shows that Congress has
not hesitated to soften the requirements of the Clean Air Act
where it has found this necessary to avoid significant
economic disruption. Tellingly, however, Congress has
never chosen to avoid such disruption by tinkering with the
NAAQS themselves. Hence, in Congress as well as in the
states and at EPA, costs find their expression in the
implementation rather than in the setting of the NAAQS.
On numerous occasions, Congress has revised the
deadlines and implementation strategies required by the Act.
See, e.g., Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 5(a)-(b), 88 Stat. 246,
258 (extending deadlines for motor vehicle emissions
standards); id. § 4, 88 Stat. at 256-58 (restricting EPA’s
authority to impose transportation control measures in
federal implementation plans and requiring a study of the
economic impact of certain transportation control measures);
Steel Industry Compliance Extension Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-23, 95 Stat. 139 (allowing, for certain iron- and steel-

producing operations, extension of deadline for compliance
with emission limitations).
In addition, the extraordinarily detailed nonattainment
provisions Congress added to the Act in 1977 and 1990
reflect just such a consideration of economic costs and
feasibility. Congress declined to require immediate strict
adherence to deadlines for NAAQS compliance that had
since passed. In 1977, for example, Congress instead
developed a program that allowed for states to develop
nonattainment plans that achieved “reasonable further
progress” toward attaining NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. 75017509a. And in 1990, Congress substantially extended (by as
much as twenty years) the deadlines for areas that had not
yet attained the NAAQS in effect at that time. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. 7511(a)(1).
In adjusting the deadlines and implementation strategies
for meeting the NAAQS, Congress itself has balanced the
public health and welfare goals of the statute against the
economic and technological challenges posed by meeting
those goals. Cf. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981). Congress has concluded that to
the extent any such balancing is relevant, its goals are best
met by confining the consideration of costs and feasibility to
implementation of the NAAQS rather than by basing the
setting of the NAAQS on such factors in the first instance.
C. The Textual Arguments of Cross-Petitioners and Their
Supporting Respondents and Amici Are Without Merit
Cross-petitioners and their supporting respondents and
amici attempt to smuggle the consideration of costs into the
process of setting the NAAQS through several arguments
based on the language of the Act. These arguments are
exceedingly weak. Indeed, insofar as cross-petitioners and
their supporters simply ignore statutory language contrary to
their central claim, their arguments border on the wholly
frivolous.
“Public Health.” Cross-petitioners and their supporting
respondents and amici argue that the term “public health”
imports consideration of compliance costs into the NAAQS-

setting process. This argument is wrong for many reasons.
First, as already discussed, in the 1970 amendments to
the Clean Air Act, Congress expressly embraced HEW’s
approach to describing impacts on public health by requiring
that EPA’s new NAAQS be based on the criteria documents
HEW had already compiled. 42 U.S.C. 7409(a)(1)(A),
7409(b)(1). HEW’s approach did not look at the economics
of regulation. Instead, it looked at the health effects of air
pollution on the human population.
Cross-petitioners’
interpretation of the words “public health” is inconsistent with
Congress’s endorsement of HEW’s criteria documents.
Moreover, cross-petitioners’ interpretation would create
an awkward situation in which costs would be relevant to
setting the primary NAAQS, but not to setting the secondary
NAAQS. Only the primary NAAQS are set according to the
requirements of “public health,” which, cross-petitioners
argue, are determined by looking at costs. 42 U.S.C.
7409(b)(1). Thus, under cross-petitioners’ interpretation of
the term “public health,” EPA is obliged to be cost-conscious
in protecting human health, but is not so obliged when
protecting the environment through the secondary NAAQS.
This interpretation is in considerable tension with Congress’s
41
predominant focus on the health effects of air pollution.
Furthermore, cross-petitioners’ argument is inconsistent
with the text of numerous provisions of the Act. Many
provisions of the Act explicitly allow or require EPA to
consider both economic costs and “public health” in setting
regulatory standards under the Act. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
7502(a)(1), 7502(a)(3)(A)(i) (motor vehicles); 42 U.S.C.
7411(a)(1), 7411(b)(1) (new source performance standards);
42 U.S.C. 7547(a)(1), 7547(a)(3) (nonroad vehicles); 42
U.S.C. 7571(a)(2)(A), 7571(b) (aircraft emissions). See also
42 U.S.C. 7612(a) (requiring economic impact analysis
describing effects of Clean Air Act standards on the “public
health” and “economy”). If “public health” includes “costs,”
41

Cross-petitioners also argue that the term “welfare” incorporates
consideration of costs, but this argument simply ignores critical
language in the definition of welfare. See infra at 31.

as cross-petitioners argue, Congress could have rested, in
every one of the cited sections, with a simple directive to
EPA to consider effects on public health. To paraphrase this
Court’s decision last Term in Public Lands Council v. Babbitt,
120 S.Ct. 1815, 1826 (2000), why would Congress add the
words “costs” if (as cross-petitioners’ argument implies) they
42
add nothing?
“Welfare.” Next, cross-petitioners argue that EPA must
consider costs in setting the NAAQS because section
108(a)(2)(C) directs EPA to describe, in its criteria
documents, “any known or anticipated adverse effects on
welfare.” 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2)(C). Because, they reason,
the definition of “welfare” includes “effects on economic
values,” the criteria documents must describe the
compliance costs of regulation. ATA Br. 37-39.
Even if cross-petitioners’ interpretation of the word
“welfare” were correct (which, as we explain below, it is not),
their argument would be irrelevant to EPA’s decision to
revise the primary NAAQS for PM and ozone. Crosspetitioners’ erroneous reading of the definition of “welfare” in
section 302(h) cannot change the language of section
109(b)(1), which requires primary NAAQS to protect the
public health. 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1). The criteria documents’
discussion of effects on welfare is not relevant to setting the
primary NAAQS; surely cross-petitioners are not arguing that
effects on wildlife, for example, should be considered in
setting the primary NAAQS, and yet effects on wildlife are
also included in the definition of “welfare.” Cross-petitioners’
arguments based on the definition of welfare are irrelevant to
the primary NAAQS.
In setting the secondary NAAQS for an air pollutant, EPA
is explicitly instructed to consider only the effects on welfare
“associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the
42

See also Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 523 U.S. 382, 388 (1998) (declining to accept
interpretation of statute that led to redundancy); United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (“a statute must, if
possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some
operative effect”).

ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2) (emphasis added).
Thus, even where secondary NAAQS are concerned, the
Clean Air Act makes clear that the only welfare effects that
are relevant are those arising from air pollution, not those
arising from regulation.
In any event, cross-petitioners’ argument that “welfare”
encompasses general economic effects is mistaken. Crosspetitioners can offer this argument only by ignoring critical
language in section 302(h)’s definition of “welfare.” Section
302(h) provides in full:
All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is
not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation,
manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility,
and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and
hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic
values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether
caused by transformation, conversion, or combination
with other air pollutants.
43
42 U.S.C. 7602(h) (emphasis added). The last, italicized
clause of this definition makes clear that the effects on
“welfare” with which Congress was concerned were only the
effects from air pollution. Cross-petitioners can argue that
“welfare” includes the compliance costs of regulation itself
only by ignoring the critical last clause of this definition;
indeed, they omit this portion of the definition from their brief
entirely without any notation, such as an ellipsis, indicating
that they have done so. ATA Br. 37-38; see also GE Am. Br.
44
16.
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The italicized clause was added in 1990, § 109(b), 104 Stat.
2470, to “make[] clear that welfare effects extend to consequences
of air pollutant emissions that may occur after the pollutant has
been chemically altered following its release, and to effects caused
by the combined impacts of air pollutants.” H.R. Rep. No. 101490, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 274 (1990) (emphasis added).
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Cross-petitioners’ interpretation of the words “welfare” and
“public health” also would render unnecessary section 108(b)(1)’s
directive to EPA to furnish information on pollution control costs.
42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1). If information on costs were a requisite part
of the criteria documents, as cross-petitioners argue, then there

“Appropriate.” Respondents in support of cross-petitioners
argue that cost-benefit analysis is imported into the NAAQSsetting process via the word “appropriate” in section
109(d)(1). App. Pwr. Br. 39-40. Again, however, reading the
entire statutory provision at issue serves to defeat
respondents’ argument.
Section 109(d)(1) provides in
pertinent part:
Not later than December 31, 1980, and at five-year
intervals thereafter, the Administrator shall complete a
thorough review of the criteria published under section
7408 of this title and the national ambient air quality
standards promulgated under this section and shall make
such revisions in such criteria and standards and
promulgate such new standards as may be appropriate in
accordance with section 7408 of this title and subsection
(b) of this section.
42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(1) (emphasis added).
Thus
“appropriateness” is defined by the requirements of sections
108 and 109(b), which, we have established, do not require
or allow cost-benefit balancing.
Furthermore, the word “appropriate” appears only in
reference to the revision of an existing NAAQS or the post1980 establishment of a new NAAQS, not in reference to the
setting of the first NAAQS in the 1970s. According to
respondents’ view that the word “appropriate” has a separate
office from the Act’s other language, then, the initial NAAQS
set in the 1970s must have been governed by a different
standard than revisions to the NAAQS. Section 109(b)(1)
explicitly rules out such a possibility; it provides that primary
NAAQS “may be revised in the same manner as
promulgated.” 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1).
“Adequate margin of safety.” Respondents supporting
cross-petitioners argue that Congress must have meant, in
requiring a margin of safety, to require EPA to consider
costs. App. Pwr. Br. 36. However, as explained above,
supra at 20-21, Congress required a margin of safety in
would have been no need for a separate requirement that EPA
develop information on the costs of pollution control.

1970 in response to HEW’s conviction that the lowest levels
at which scientific research had shown adverse effects were
probably not the lowest levels at which such effects
occurred. In its early criteria documents–on which Congress
required EPA to base the first NAAQS (42 U.S.C.
7409(a)(1), 7408(b))–HEW had thus recommended a
“margin of safety” designed to protect subpopulations more
vulnerable to the effects of air pollution than the general
45
population. The requirement of a margin of safety was thus
a response to scientific uncertainty, not a way to sneak
46
economic consequences into the setting of the NAAQS.
“Judgment.”
Several amici argue that the word
“judgment” in section 109(b)(1) requires EPA to consider
costs. GE Am. Br. 13; Hatch Am. Br. 9-10. As we set forth
above, however, supra at 23, this term signals only
Congress’s candid recognition of the uncertainties attending
decisions about the quality of air requisite to protect the
public health.
The term cannot fairly be read,
notwithstanding amici’s claim, to allow the Administrator to
consider any factor that she might in her own “judgment”
deem relevant. Indeed, that is precisely the kind of fanciful
statutory interpretation that, unlike the reading we support,
could theoretically raise a nondelegation issue.
Public comments. Remarkably, cross-petitioners also
argue that the fact that EPA must respond to the public’s
“written comments, data, or documentary information,” 42
U.S.C. 7607(d)(3), means that these comments, data, and
information will be “part of the Administrator’s
decisionmaking data set.” ATA Br. 40. That is to say,
apparently, the Administrator must consider anything
45

See, e.g., 1970 Ozone Criteria Doc., supra, at 10-13.
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The concept of a margin of safety has a long history in
toxicology. Toxicologists have long recommended that acceptable
daily intakes of toxic substances be determined by dividing by 100
the level at which no adverse human health effects have been
found to occur, in order to account for variations in the sensitivity of
the human population. See National Research Council, Science
and Judgment in Risk Assessment 29-31 (1994).

submitted in the public record as relevant to her decision
setting the NAAQS. Such a process would allow public
commenters to determine the scope and content of EPA’s
obligations in setting the NAAQS. The proposition is
fantastical.
Information to States on Control Technologies. Crosspetitioners also assert that costs must be considered in
setting the NAAQS because Congress directed EPA to
provide information on the costs and feasibility of control
technologies in issuing new air quality criteria pursuant to
section 108(a). ATA Br. 40. This argument, too, is
misguided for several reasons.
As explained above, supra at 17, when Congress
amended the Clean Air Act in 1970, it eliminated language
that had previously required air quality standards to be
consistent with both air quality criteria and the information on
47
control techniques HEW had been required to provide.
Moreover, the Act itself distinguishes the “criteria” on which
NAAQS are to be based from the information on control
techniques required by section 108(b)(1).
42 U.S.C.
7408(b)(1). Cross-petitioners would undo these careful
legislative determinations by contending that the information
on control techniques must influence the setting of the
48
NAAQS.
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Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec. 108(c)(1), 81
Stat. 485, 492.
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Cross-petitioners’ claim that this Court should import cost
considerations into section 109(b) because the statute does not
say that the NAAQS should be based “solely” on the criteria (ATA
Br. 39) likewise ignores the full language of the statute clearly
distinguishing criteria from information on costs, 42 U.S.C.
7408(b)(1); ignores Congress’s deliberate decision in 1970 to
uncouple the choice of standards from information on costs and
feasibility, see Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, sec.
108(c)(1), § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 492; and ignores Congress’s ability,
demonstrated elsewhere in the Act, to direct EPA to consider costs
when it wanted the agency to do so. Congress need not have
added the extra word “solely” to add an extra dollop of clarity to an
already plain statutory scheme.
Cross-petitioners’ contrary

The information on control techniques required by section
108(b)(1) was clearly designed not to affect the NAAQSsetting process, but instead to give the states a running start
on developing plans to implement the NAAQS. In requiring
that this information be provided to “states and appropriate
air pollution control agencies,” Congress clearly
contemplated that this information would be used by such
entities in implementing the NAAQS in timely fashion. 42
49
U.S.C. 7408(b)(1).
Indeed, the state respondents
supporting cross-petitioners recognized this point in the court
below. They argued that EPA had erred in failing to provide
the information required by section 108(b) with respect to the
rules at issue here, complaining that EPA had “side-stepped
its responsibility under §108 to assist the States by
developing fundamental information, thus making it much
more difficult for the States to develop and implement
adequate control strategies.” State Petitioners’ Final Merit
Br., at 9, American Trucking Assns. v. Browner, No. 97-1440
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
CASAC advice. Cross-petitioners also maintain that
section 109(d)(2)(C)(iv) imports cost considerations into the
NAAQS-setting process. ATA Br. 41. This is plainly wrong.
Section 109(d)(2)(C)(iv) requires CASAC to
suggestion is merely a variant of their misguided request for a new
canon of statutory construction, discussed infra at 39-41.
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The Senate Report on the 1970 Amendments explained:
“Reports on control techniques, as under existing law, would be
issued simultaneously with the publication of criteria.
The
Committee recognizes that the States will continue to need this
information to develop meaningful programs for implementation of
ambient air quality standards on a regional basis.” S. Rep. No. 911196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1970). Cross-petitioners can see
no purpose in EPA’s development of information on control costs
and technologies, other than to inform the NAAQS-setting process,
because they are apparently unable to believe that Congress
would want to give the states plenty of time to contemplate their
possible regulatory responses to changes in the NAAQS. ATA Br.
40 (referring to “inexplicably premature” mandate of section
108(b)(1)).

advise the Administrator of any adverse public health,
welfare, social, economic, or energy effects which may
result from various strategies for attainment and
maintenance of such national ambient air quality
standards.
42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2)(C)(iv) (emphasis added).
Crosspetitioners, once again, simply ignore critical language in the
statutory text as well as the basic distinction Congress drew
between the setting and the implementing of NAAQS, in
which Congress allowed for consideration of costs only with
regard to the latter.
Section 109(d)(2)(c)(iv) explicitly
requires CASAC to report only on the broad implications of
“strategies for” attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS,
not on the implications of the NAAQS themselves.
Moreover, CASAC’s charge to recommend new or revised
NAAQS is explicitly tied to the standard-setting requirements
of section 108 and 109(b), 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2)(B); nothing
in section 109(d)(2)(c)(iv) purports to change those
requirements.
“Productive capacity.” Respondents in support of crosspetitioners also make the far-fetched claim that cost-benefit
analysis is required by the Clean Air Act because the
preamble to the Act identifies as one of the purposes of the
statute the promotion of “the public health and welfare and
the productive capacity of [the nation’s] population.” App.
Pwr. Br. 29, quoting 42 U.S.C 7401(b)(1). This preamble
language, which has been unchanged since the 1963 Clean
50
Air Act, does not even remotely support respondents’
reading of it.
The preamble makes clear that the
population’s health, welfare, and productive capacity are to
be “promote[d]” by “protect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the quality
of the Nation’s air resources”–not by refusing to regulate in
the face of demonstrable health risks. 42 U.S.C. 7401(b)(1).
D. Neither the Nondelegation Doctrine Nor CrossPetitioners’ Proposed Cost-Benefit Canon Can Override
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See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1(b)(1), 77 Stat.
392, 393.

the Plain Meaning of the Statutory Language
No doubt insecure about their arguments based on the
statutory text, cross-petitioners seek refuge in canons of
statutory construction. The first canon cross-petitioners
invoke is that of avoiding constitutional invalidation where a
constitutional interpretation of a statute is available. The
second is a new canon proposed by cross-petitioners which
would inject a cost-benefit test into any environmental
statute that did not use certain magic words in precluding
such a test. Neither canon should be used to defeat the
plain meaning of the Clean Air Act.
1. Because There Is No “Grave Constitutional Doubt”
About the Clean Air Act, The Court Should Decline
Cross-Petitioners’ Invitation to Use the Nondelegation
Doctrine as an Excuse to Rewrite the Statute
As we discussed in detail in our opening brief in Browner
v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., No. 99-1257, the
Clean Air Act, and EPA’s interpretation of the Act, are plainly
constitutional under this Court’s precedents on delegation.
MA & NJ Br. 28-43. Moreover, as set forth above, crosspetitioners’ proffered interpretation of the Act is inconsistent
with the plain meaning of the Act. Thus, by asking this Court
to adopt their interpretation of the Act in order to avoid
deciding the constitutional issue reached by the court below,
cross-petitioners are inviting this Court to rewrite a statute in
order to avoid deciding a straightforward and well-settled
constitutional issue. The Court should decline to do so.
Just last Term, this Court affirmed “the guiding principle
that ‘where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions
arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided,
our duty is to adopt the latter.’” Jones v. United States, 120
S.Ct. 1904, 1911 (2000), quoting United States ex rel.
Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
408 (1909). Cross-petitioners’ arguments fail each of the
three requirements of the principle stated in Jones: as we
established above, the Clean Air Act is not susceptible of

two constructions; as we set forth in detail in our opening
brief in Browner v. American Trucking Associations,
precluding costs in the setting of the NAAQS does not raise
“grave and doubtful constitutional questions”; and, finally, as
discussed
below,
cross-petitioners’
proffered
interpretation(s) would not even avoid the constitutional
question as they present it.
This case is before the Court because the court of
appeals created a new requirement in the name of the
nondelegation doctrine–one that demands that guidance for
administrative action prescribe a quantitative “stopping point”
for regulation. U.S. Pet. App. 11a. The problem for crosspetitioners and their supporters is that the various
interpretations of the Clean Air Act they offer do not supply
51
such a “stopping point.”
Nowhere do cross-petitioners
identify exactly what the cost-benefit balancing they desire
would entail.
Indeed, they offer the Court a virtual
smorgasbord of possibilities (ATA Br. 30), ranging from
analysis “under ‘significant risk’ and similar rubrics” to
analysis based on “quality-adjusted life years” to the kind of
cost-benefit analysis endorsed in International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
which required “identifying values for lost years of human life
and for suffering and other losses from non-fatal injuries.”
Id. at 1320.
Quite apart from the administrative license created by
cross-petitioners’ failure to choose among the multitudinous
ways in which costs can be taken into account in setting
regulatory standards, none of cross-petitioners’ analytical
frameworks, even viewed in isolation, identifies a stopping
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Cross-petitioners and their supporters cannot even agree as to
whether the Act permits or requires EPA to consider costs in
setting the NAAQS (compare ATA Br. 32 with Inhofe Am. Br. 10),
and thus cannot agree as to whether Congress itself made the
most basic choice inherent in health and safety regulation–whether
to balance human lives against economic costs. Cf. Industrial
Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).

point for regulation. An instruction from this Court telling
EPA to consider quality-adjusted life years rather than lives
lost, for example, would not tell EPA how many life years it
should strive to save. It would, at most, tell the agency not
to worry quite so much about the effects of air pollution on
the elderly, the disabled, and the ill.
2. Cross-Petitioners’ Proposed Cost-Benefit Canon
Cannot Override the Plain Meaning of the Statute and
Would Improperly Subvert the Legislative Process
As much as conceding the weakness of their arguments
based on the statutory language, cross-petitioners and their
supporting respondents and amici urge this Court to adopt a
new canon of construction. ATA Br. 46-47; App. Pwr. Br. 4647; GE Am. Br. 18-22. The plainest statement of the content
of this new canon appears in General Electric’s brief: “[A]
federal agency is required to consider costs and risk tradeoffs in the absence of an express congressional statement
forbidding the agency from doing so.” GE Am. Br. 18. GE
submits that this new requirement should apply only to
“environmental and other regulatory statutes.” Id. at 1.
Cross-petitioners and their supporters ask this Court, in
other words, to adopt a canon of construction that licenses
the rewriting of a particular category of statutes. This is a
radical request, and one this Court should roundly reject.
Cross-petitioners’ new canon would have this Court
ignore the language of the Clean Air Act establishing that
Congress deliberately excluded the consideration of costs
from the process of setting the NAAQS. Because Congress
did not, three decades ago, foresee this new canon and
therefore did not then know that it must use certain explicit,
magic words in excluding the consideration of costs,
Congress’s work could be undone. This is not a canon of
statutory construction at all; it is a canon of statutory
destruction.
Congress itself has, moreover, rejected an interpretive
principle like the one recommended by cross-petitioners.
Very recently, Congress considered and rejected bills that
would have imposed what came to be known as a

“supermandate” on agencies charged with protecting human
health and the environment. This supermandate, like the
canon proposed by cross-petitioners, would have applied a
cost-benefit test to federal regulations. See H.R. 9, 104th
Cong. § 422(a)(2), (b)(1) (March 10, 1995); S. 343, 104th
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Cong., § 629(a) (1995).
The question whether to apply a generic cost-benefit test
to health and environmental regulation is a public policy
decision of the highest order. Congress so far has not
embraced such an across-the-board test. This Court should
not wade into these politically charged waters by adopting
the cost-benefit canon cross-petitioners propose.
II. Interpreting the Clean Air Act to Preclude the
Consideration of Costs in Setting the NAAQS Does Not
Lead to Irrational Results
At the end of the day, the real complaint of crosspetitioners and their supporting respondents and amici is
that the Clean Air Act does not reflect “wise social policy.”
App. Pwr. Cross-Pet. 7. Their contention that the law is
unwise, however, rests on a mischaracterization of the law in
operation and is belied by three decades of success. Their
argument, moreover, fundamentally misapprehends the role
of this Court in relation to the Congress.
Precluding Cost-Benefit Balancing in Setting the
NAAQS Will Not Lead to Deindustrialization
Throughout their briefs, cross-petitioners and their
supporting respondents and amici suggest that precluding
the consideration of costs in setting the NAAQS will force
EPA to set standards for criteria pollutants at zero, thus
effectively ending industrial activity in this country. They
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The brief of amici Environmental Defense, et al., provides a
detailed discussion of the extensive congressional debates over,
and rejection of, generic cost-benefit tests for federal health and
environmental regulation.

believe this result follows from the “nonthreshold” character
of the criteria pollutants. Their argument betrays a deep
misunderstanding of the concept of a nonthreshold pollutant.
As a consequence, cross-petitioners seriously misrepresent
EPA’s degree of authority under the statute.
Cross-petitioners implicitly embrace a conception of
nonthreshold pollutants as pollutants that have been shown
not to have a threshold, that is, pollutants that have been
shown to have adverse effects on human health or the
environment at every nonzero level. This is not EPA’s
conception of a nonthreshold pollutant.
When EPA discusses the possibility that particulate
matter and ozone are nonthreshold pollutants, it is referring
to the fact that these pollutants have not been shown to have
a threshold, that is, it has not been demonstrated that these
pollutants cease to have adverse effects on human health or
the environment below a certain level. EPA does not claim
to have proven that PM and ozone have adverse effects on
human health at every nonzero level. See NAAQS for
Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,863 (1997); NAAQS for PM,
62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,674-75 (1997). Thus, when EPA
discusses the possibility that these are “nonthreshold”
pollutants, it is referring to a lack of evidence that there is a
threshold.
This lack of evidence would not be sufficient to support a
NAAQS. The Clean Air Act requires the Administrator to
present evidence of harm before she may set or revise the
NAAQS. She may not set the NAAQS based on the lack of
evidence of no harm. Section 108(a)(2) makes this point
plain: the criteria on which the NAAQS are to be based must
describe “all identifiable effects on public health or welfare.”
42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2) (emphasis added). Indeed, if EPA
were allowed to set the NAAQS based on the lack of
evidence of no harm, there would be no need to develop
criteria documents at all, because EPA would not be
required to show health effects before regulating. In such a
regime, it would presumably be up to the regulated
community to show the harmlessness of air pollution, rather
than being up to the government to show its harmfulness.
This is not the regulatory regime created by the Clean Air
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Act.
As a consequence, cross-petitioners’ claim that EPA is
required to set pollutant levels at zero when faced with a
nonthreshold pollutant is mistaken. ATA Br. 25. EPA is not
required to set the NAAQS at zero for such pollutants
because nonthreshold pollutants are not what crosspetitioners claim them to be; they are not pollutants that
have been shown to be harmful at all nonzero levels, they
are pollutants that have not been shown to be harmless at all
nonzero levels. Indeed, if EPA did indeed attempt to set a
NAAQS based on the lack of evidence of harmlessness
rather than based on affirmative evidence of harmfulness,
we expect that cross-petitioners would be first in line to
challenge the agency’s decision.
B. Precluding EPA from Considering Costs in Setting
the NAAQS Does Not Allow the Administrator Privately
to Consider Costs While Publicly Denying It
Cross-petitioners argue that EPA should be required to
consider costs in setting the NAAQS because this would
simply formalize an informal system that has developed in
which the Administrator privately considers costs in setting
the NAAQS while publicly denying she is doing so. ATA Br.
43-45. Their evidence for this allegation of unspoken but
routinized illegality is altogether unpersuasive.
In addition to engaging in rank speculation about what
Administrator Browner’s private thoughts might have been
during the PM and ozone rulemakings at issue here, ATA Br.
44, cross-petitioners assert that Administrators Costle and
Ruckelshaus considered costs in NAAQS rulemakings
53

In contrast, in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), this Court addressed the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s “cancer policy,”
which presumed that no safe level of carcinogenic substances
existed and required workplace standards to be set based on this
presumption. Id. at 624. EPA has not adopted this kind of
presumption in setting the NAAQS.
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undertaken during their tenures at EPA. But both Costle
55
and Ruckelshaus were careful to ensure that their final
decisions were not based on statutorily proscribed factors.
In both instances, to be sure, as cross-petitioners’
sources note, the Administrator (or, in Ruckelshaus’s case,
EPA staff) had before him information on the costs of
56
implementing the standards he was in the midst of setting.
This demonstrates nothing.
In NAAQS rulemaking
proceedings, EPA is commonly confronted with information
on costs even though it has repeatedly denied the relevance
57
of this information. Moreover, EPA is charged at once with
setting and with implementing the NAAQS. As emphasized
throughout this brief, it is perfectly appropriate for EPA to
consider costs in implementing the NAAQS. Because the
process of implementation begins straight on the heels of
setting the NAAQS, an Administrator will naturally have
before her information on the implementation of standards
even as she sets them. Indeed, as cross-petitioners have
emphasized, EPA must issue information on the costs and
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Mark K. Landy, et al., The Environmental Protection Agency:
Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon to Clinton 70 (1994).
Indeed, Costle rejected the standard recommended by economic
advisors hostile to the Clean Air Act’s prohibition on the
consideration of costs. As Landy, whose account of Costle’s
deliberations forms the basis of cross-petitioners’ speculations,
summarized it: these economic advisors “could argue about the
statute as much as they wanted, Costle felt, but they could not
fault him for following it.” Id. at 73.
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ATA Br. 44.
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See Landy, supra, at 67-70 (Costle’s decision); Thomas O.
McGarity, Reinventing Rationality 47-48 (1991) (Ruckelshaus’s
decision).
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In fact, respondents and amici supporting cross-petitioners obtain
their outsized estimates of the costs and other consequences of
the revised PM and ozone NAAQS from comments placed in the
docket in the rulemakings at issue here. See App. Pwr. Br. 4, n. 4;
id. at 18, n. 45; GE Am. Br. 9.

feasibility of control measures “simultaneously with” issuing
the criteria documents on which the NAAQS are based. 42
U.S.C. 7408(b)(1).
So long as, in setting the NAAQS, the Administrator
excludes the cost information from her determination, the
statutory mandate is satisfied. There is absolutely no
grounds in the record before this Court to presume that any
Administrator has ever violated that clear duty.
Equally important, the possibility that an Administrator will
act unlawfully by considering factors that are statutorily
proscribed is not reason to rewrite a statute to take account
of those factors. If an Administrator were ever to consider
statutorily proscribed factors in setting a NAAQS, resort
could be had to the judicial process and to the standard
allowing an agency action to be overturned if “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. 706(2)(A).
C. Congress Acted Rationally in Precluding EPA from
Considering Costs in Setting NAAQS While Allowing
EPA to Consider Costs in Implementing Them
Respondents argue that precluding the consideration of
costs in setting the NAAQS defeats the public-health
purposes of the Act by imposing regulatory costs that harm
people’s health. App. Pwr. Br. 18. In addition, crosspetitioners assert that EPA cannot reasonably maintain a
distinction between the consideration of costs in setting the
NAAQS and the consideration of costs in implementing
them. ATA Br. 45-47. Neither claim has merit. Not only did
Congress sensibly address the potential tradeoffs between
regulatory costs and health, but the distinction between
setting the NAAQS and implementing them has served
federal air pollution control efforts well.
Respondents and amici supporting cross-petitioners seek
to convince this Court that interpreting the Act to forbid EPA
to consider the health effects of the economic consequences
of regulation in setting the NAAQS would be irrational. In
fact, their briefs repeatedly suggest that people will die if

EPA is allowed to set the NAAQS without balancing costs
against benefits. According to the respondents and amici
supporting cross-petitioners, anywhere from approximately
3,000 to 27,000 people will die as a result of the costs of the
58
revised PM and ozone standards.
There is not one bit of empirical evidence supporting
these outlandish claims. Cross-petitioners’ supporters cite
no empirical study on the effect of the costs of any actual
regulation on human health, let alone any empirical study on
59
the effect of the cost of these standards on human health.
Instead, they refer to two sets of controversial studies which,
based on abstract, theoretical economic models, purport to
find a generalizable relationship between regulatory costs
and human mortality. These studies are filled to the brim
with controversial assumptions about the income-depressing
effects of regulation, the effects of wealth on health, and
60
even the value of a human life.
Suffice it to say that respondents’ and amici’s unqualified
assertions about the relationship between the costs of public
health regulation and public health itself are subject to
extremely serious empirical and normative criticisms.
However, this Court is not the forum for resolving these
complex empirical and normative issues; rather, Congress is
the “preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and
judgments of social value.” Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S.Ct.
58

See Mercatus Center Am. Br. 19 n. 14; App. Pwr. Br. 18.
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Indeed, respondents’ risk estimates are based on cost estimates
that themselves are wholly unsubstantiated. App. Pwr. 18 n. 45.
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Respondents and amici rely on: Ralph L. Keeney and Kenneth
Green, Estimating Fatalities Induced by Economic Impacts of
EPA’s Ozone and Particulate Standards (1997) (unpublished
paper available on web page of Reason Public Policy Institute);
Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic
Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147 (1990); and Randall Lutter,
John F. Morrall, III, & W. Kip Viscusi, The Cost-Per-Life-Saved
Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulatons, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 599
(1999).

2143, 2150 (2000). And, in the Clean Air Act, Congress has
resolved these issues by prohibiting EPA from considering
costs in setting the NAAQS but allowing the agency to
consider costs in implementing them. Indeed, Congress
specifically provided limited, targeted escape valves allowing
departures from the requirements of the Act where
significant economic disruptions or unemployment would
otherwise result. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7410(f)-(g). This was
a perfectly reasonable and rational response to the complex
empirical and normative issues raised by the prospect that
ceasing economic activity that “endanger[s] public health
and welfare,” 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(1)(A), might lead to a loss in
income.
Congress’s distinction between the factors relevant to
setting the NAAQS and those relevant to implementing them
is similarly reasonable. Contrary to cross-petitioners’ claims,
the Clean Air Act’s NAAQS program has been a large-scale
success. From a purely environmental perspective, the
program has resulted in a substantial absolute reduction in
61
emissions of almost all of the criteria pollutants.
But what
is most striking is that these reductions have occurred
alongside significant increases in population and economic
activity. The quality of the ambient air Americans breathe
every day has improved dramatically while the economy has
expanded and our national wealth has increased. In the
absence of the controls imposed by the Clean Air Act, those
increases in economic activity would undoubtedly have been
accompanied by a significant worsening of air quality.
Even from the perspective of a traditional economic
analysis, the success of the Clean Air Act cannot fairly be
gainsaid. According to EPA’s peer-reviewed economic
analysis, the reductions in emissions of air pollutants have
most likely produced trillions of dollars more in benefits than
62
they have imposed in costs. A congressionally mandated
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See Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves,
supra, at 280.
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See EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, supra, at
ES-8.

study of the Clean Air Act’s benefits and costs, published
last year, anticipates that the benefits of the Act between
63
1990 and 2010 will exceed the costs by a ratio of 4 to 1.
The Clean Air Act reflects Congress’s central insight that
the best way to achieve such dramatically positive results
was not to base the nation’s objectives for environmental
quality on prospective cost-benefit analysis. Congress
understood the pitfalls presented by basing environmental
objectives on cost-benefit analysis in the first instance rather
than taking such concerns dynamically into account at later
stages, while implementing controls to achieve those
objectives.
Because of the proclivity of cost-benefit analysis for
quantification and commensuration, cost-benefit analysis
tends to highlight those costs and benefits that can be both
quantified and stated in terms of a common metric, such as
dollars.
It follows that cost-benefit analysis tends to
underrate those things that cannot be so quantified and
monetized; it tends, in Professor Tribe’s famous formulation,
64
to “dwarf[] soft variables.”
This feature of cost-benefit analysis makes it a particularly
unhelpful analytical framework for setting air quality
standards under the Clean Air Act. While a retrospective
cost-benefit analysis may, like that done with respect to the
Clean Air Act, demonstrate the wisdom of policy choices
decades after those choices were made, a prospective costbenefit analysis might have discouraged a policymaker from
making those very same choices in the first instance.
On the cost side, for example, it is very difficult accurately
to estimate the consequences of a technology-forcing
regulatory requirement before that requirement has forced
any technology. It is much easier to assume that the
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EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990 to 2010,
v (1999).
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Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 Yale L.J. 1315, 1318-19 &
n.25 (1974).

technology used to implement the new requirement will be
the same as, and cost as much as, the technology that
existed before the requirement was imposed. And indeed,
this is the approach taken by EPA when it has, as it is
obliged to do by Executive Order, tried to estimate the costs
of the NAAQS. With respect to the rules at issue here, EPA
thought its cost estimates would prove significantly
overstated because of the likely effects of technological
65
innovations. But it could not quantify these effects, and so
they do not show up in its economic analysis.
Likewise, with respect to benefits, the empirical and
normative complexity of quantifying and monetizing the
benefits of good health, long life, and fresh air are well
known. When these benefits cannot be quantified or
monetized, they do not amount to much in cost-benefit
66
analysis.
Even when they can be both quantified and
monetized, an important normative shift occurs when the
analyst begins to ask not how clean must the air be to
protect public health but how much would citizens pay to
67
make it so.
Under the Clean Air Act, then, prospective cost-benefit
analysis of the kind cross-petitioners endorse would tend to
have the following effect: it would tend to overestimate costs
(because it could not adequately account for technological
innovation) and underestimate benefits (because so many
important things cannot be counted). The result would likely
be a systematic tendency toward underprotection of the
health and welfare central to the Act.
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See Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Environmental
Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analyses for the Particulate
Matter and Ozone NAAQS and Proposed Regional Haze Rule at
9-2 to 9-4 (1997).
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See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1219
(5th Cir. 1991) (dismissing importance of unquantified benefits of
banning asbestos in course of disapproving EPA’s cost-benefit
analysis of the ban).
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Cf. Tribe, supra, at 1329-32.

Congress decided in the 1970 Clean Air Act to respond to
the inherent uncertainties of cost-benefit analysis and its
tendency to compromise environmental objectives by
excluding its consideration from the setting of NAAQS. No
68
doubt this was “drastic medicine,” but Congress had
69
declared a “war against air pollution,” and it knew that wars
are not won by setting one’s sights as low as possible.
Of course, the question before the Court is not ultimately
whether the Court believes, as we do, that Congress acted
wisely in 1970 in deliberately deciding not to compromise its
national goals for clean air based on cost-benefit analysis.
For the Constitution wisely entrusts Congress with the
responsibility
for
making
those
important
policy
determinations.
Cross-petitioners’ exclusive remedy
remains now, as it has been for the past thirty years, in the
legislature and not the courts.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed
insofar as the court held that the Clean Air Act precludes
EPA from considering costs in setting the NAAQS.
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116 Cong. Rec. 32, 904 (Statement of Sen. Muskie).
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H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, at 1 (1970).
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